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the multipolar nuclear world we now
inhabit. The Department of Defense
has an Air-Sea Battle Office, as does
the U.S. Navy, and his discussion at the
end of chapter 3 is aimed, presumably,
at the folks inhabiting those organizations and their strategic masters.
Friedberg forecasts two potential ASB
approaches: a “linear” approach that
uses existing resources and technology and, in contrast, a “discontinuous”
approach that relies heavily on new
technologies and un-fielded weapons
concepts (pp. 95–98). Friedberg seems
to prefer the linear approach, given the
ease with which it can be implemented
(although that ease does not mean it
will be inexpensive), but he does not
rule out investigating new technologies. He is obviously wary of “betting
the farm” on a “futures” approach.
In his final chapter, Friedberg describes
two indirect approaches or “alternatives”
to ASB: either a distant blockade or
what he calls “maritime denial” (pp. 104,
116–17). He again applies an analytic
framework to assess the efficacy of these
less-offensive-oriented approaches. Distant blockade is merely economic warfare. It would aim at Chinese shipping,
principally oil tankers at the key straits’
entrances leading through the SCS to
Chinese ports. Maritime denial is simply
ASB limited primarily to the global commons and PRC littoral inside the first island chain. One might characterize maritime denial as an active defense of the
global commons, but again it is reactive,
not something to implement without
significant Chinese military provocation.
The conclusion reviews the bidding on
everything discussed. Here Friedberg
comes across as a bit more bellicose than
one might expect, implying that a mix
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of all three approaches—ASB, distant
blockade, and maritime denial—would
probably be the best course of action.
Friedberg comes closest to the nub of
the issue when he writes: “The first
dividing line in the debate over this issue
is between the advocates of maritime
denial, who seek to avoid strikes against
targets on the Chinese mainland, and
the proponents of ASB, who believe
that war cannot be won without such
attacks” (p. 137). However, he leaves
the door open for the reader to make
up his or her own mind on the issue.
While this might be perceived as
strength, it is also something of a disappointment, because this reviewer wanted
to know what Friedberg really recommends. Friedberg is clearly not of the
opinion that ASB should be dismissed,
and seems to support a course of action
that implies the direct approach option
while being ready, at a moment’s notice,
to implement the other two approaches
in response to a PRC “first strike” (p. 37).
Friedberg leverages all the latest writing
on the topic, using the work of writers familiar to naval audiences such as
Jan van Tol and Wayne Hughes. He has
done his homework, and now it is time
for all others to do theirs as the United
States faces the A2/AD challenge.
JOHN T. KUEHN

Preble, Christopher, and John Mueller, eds. A
Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute,
2014. 224pp. $12.95

Medical doctors are trained to recognize when patients’ complaints and
self-diagnoses need to be ignored, lest
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the doctor be responsible for unnecessary medical treatment. It is unfortunate
that we do not have similar education
for national security officials regarding
threats to the nation. With such training, there is a chance we could avoid
at least some of the overreactions to
misperceived threats that have burdened recent American foreign policy.
There is a significant and growing
literature addressing the issue of threat
inflation, and Christopher A. Preble and
John Mueller’s edited volume A Dangerous World? is an important contribution in this area. Published by the Cato
Institute, it is a collection of sixteen
essays by an array of authors, each
delving into a different aspect of the
U.S. threat environment. Their aim is to
question the assumptions that underpin
so much of U.S. national security policy:
that we live in a perilous world riven
by uncertainty and threats, and only a
robust, expensive, and active defense
preserves the homeland’s security.
To this end, the work addresses a wide
range of topics, each examined by a
different contributor. Francis Gavin
and John Mueller separately examine
America’s history of nuclear alarmism,
noting that predictions of imminent
explosions in a number of nuclear weapons states have been commonplace for
decades. Lyle Goldstein argues convincingly that the threat China poses to the
United States is a limited one (he uses
the memorable phrase “panda claws”)
and he claims China’s rise can be countered with low-cost strategies. (As of this
writing, recent devaluations of the yuan
raise the possibility of a future Chinese
retrenchment, further reducing the need
for a potent American counter.) Former
U.S. intelligence officer Paul Pillar
explores substate threats (including
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terror groups), asserting that America is
too quick to seize on new threats. Since
9/11, more Americans have drowned
in their bathtubs than have been killed
in the United States by terrorist attacks,
and improved security cannot account
for the entirety of this disparity.
Michael Cohen asks whether other
aspects of personal welfare, such as
health security, should also be addressed in our discussions of security.
Daniel Drezner explores the economic
benefits of American military preeminence, and finds them elusive. The
United States has spent trillions on
homeland defense and overseas confrontations since 9/11, Drezner notes,
while the total economic impact of
9/11 itself was “only” $100 billion.
Elsewhere, Christopher Fettweis examines the pervasive anxiety in American
national security culture, arguing that
“geopolitical fear” has become something of an American tradition, passed
on from generation to generation.
“Wealth creates insecurity in individuals, and it seems to do so in states as
well.” Benjamin Friedman explores the
issue of threat inflation, arguing that
America’s vast power “distributes the
costs” and “concentrates the benefits”
of confrontational policies, creating
constituencies that promote (and even
become dependent on) maintaining a state of unnecessary vigilance.
In many respects, America can afford
to exaggerate the world’s perils. There
is no meaningful political pressure to
reduce the budget of the Department
of Defense, and America’s national
security expenditures, large though
they are, constitute only a fraction of
the federal budget. At the same time,
one must also consider the risk that
threat inflation poses to American
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lives. More Americans were killed as a
consequence of the decision to invade
Iraq in 2003 than on 9/11 itself. But
there is also the long-term causal impact
of the U.S. invasion. The existence
of ISIS is another unintended consequence of the American invasion.
It is true that there are dangers in this
world. But Preble and Mueller’s volume
constitutes an antidote to America’s
tendency to imagine grave peril, and
serves as an important counter to the
American proclivity to overstate the
benefits and understate the costs of an
assertive global military posture. The
editors argue that America is largely
free of threats that require military
preparedness or balancing behavior.
In his chapter, Fettweis argues that
America’s tendency to exaggerate the
world’s dangers can be altered, since it is
based on a system of beliefs that can be
changed over time. Let’s hope he’s right.
ANDREW STIGLER

Hassan, Hassan, and Michael Weiss. ISIS: Inside
the Army of Terror. New York: Regan Arts, 2015.
288pp. $16.95

The surprising success of the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in seizing control of large parts of northern
and western Iraq in 2014 has generated many questions for policy makers
and the public. How was this group so
effective so quickly? Where did it come
from and how did so many observers miss its rise? What threat does
ISIS pose to the region and beyond?
Hassan Hassan and Michael Weiss address these questions in this recent book
about ISIS. The work is part history of
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the ISIS movement and part analysis
of its nature and strategy. The authors’
backgrounds—Weiss is a prolific
journalist and Hassan a knowledgeable
Syrian analyst at the Delma Institute
in Abu Dhabi—combine brilliantly to
explain the rapidly evolving events on
the ground within the context of the
political-military issues in the region.
Hassan and Weiss interviewed current
and former ISIS movement fighters in
Syria, dissected ISIS propaganda videos
and statements, and combined other
scholarly analyses of ISIS to produce
what I consider to be the most accurate
assessment of ISIS currently available.
The overwhelming strength of the book
is that Hassan and Weiss get the history
of ISIS right. Although it is often mistakenly thought of as a recent phenomenon,
the authors correctly trace the group’s
evolution as a core of Salafist-oriented
fighters who joined together under Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq in 2002–2003.
Zarqawi’s unique outlook, based in the
same Salafi-jihadist school as Osama
Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, imprinted on
the ISIS movement early and has been
the biggest factor in the popularization of its distinct ideology and the
evolution of its tactics and strategy. The
authors capture this dynamic, as well as
ISIS’s subsequent transformation from
a foreign fighter–based organization
to a more indigenous Iraqi-led group
that eventually split with Al Qaeda.
Because of their understanding of ISIS
history, Hassan and Weiss are able to
demonstrate the ideological foundation
behind ISIS’s strategic targeting and why
the group takes on such a large spectrum
of enemies at once. The authors are also
able to explain ISIS’s genocidal strategy
and how the group promotes its own
atrocities to inspire fear in its enemies.
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